For most of its history, Central Asia has been ruled by powerful dynasties, fallen under the vassalage of neighbouring empires or been invaded by foreign powers. Only the more remote, inaccessible tribal areas have maintained a degree of independence. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, five distinct independent nation states have emerged that are now generally referred to as ‘Central Asia’, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Regardless of who has been in power over the centuries, the one constant has been the significance of the land bridge that straddles the region connecting Europe and Asia, otherwise known as the Silk Road, or Roads. In ancient times, silks and spices travelled westwards, while furs, wools and precious metals took an eastward route. Consequently, those who controlled the trade-route accrued immense wealth.
This land bridge, or Silk Road, is now being revitalised. But rather than silks and spices, today the commodities being transported include natural gas, oil, minerals and communication systems and just as in ancient times, China remains the prime mover.
During a visit to Central Asia in September 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, which was to be known as the Belt and Road initiative. According to the official Chinese Government’s website, (The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, March 30 2015):
“Accelerating the building of the Belt and Road can help promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development.”
Although presented as a joint initiative, the reality is that such a project would be in the best interests of China. According to an article in the Diplomat, dated 1st February, 2020 (‘Potholes and Bumps Along the Silk Road Economic Belt in Central Asia’ by Li-Chen Sim and Farkhod Aminjonov), currently 80% of China’s imports, including over 50% of its oil from the Middle East, arrive by sea.
Although the Maritime Silk Road, which focusses upon the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), should improve the Republic’s maritime trade, it will still not match America’s maritime superiority. Consequently, China needs a more secure route for her energy supplies and is therefore putting greater emphasis on the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), which would provide an overland link between China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic).
Central Asia plays a key role in this initiative, not just because it provides a ‘bridge’, as in previous centuries, but because the region is valuable in and of itself. It has rich hydrocarbon and mineral resources, as well as rare earth and metals that are used, among other things, for solar panels and rechargeable batteries, all of which are vital to China’s economic growth.
China offers Central Asian countries generous loans in order to develop local infrastructure, such as roads and railways. In most cases, these loans take no account of political, economic or human rights issues. Consequently, they are attractive to authoritarian regimes and Sim and Aminjonov claim that few go through a tender process and up to 30% of funding is lost through corruption.
It is further observed that the local population does not necessarily benefit from Chinese-funded projects. For example, over 80% of workers on a Central Asian project may be migrant Chinese, while less than 10% of the jobs go to the local population. On the other hand, under a multi-national project, less than 30% of jobs would go to the Chinese, with over 40% to local people. The conclusion is that while multi-national, or Western projects, are more transparent, they remain at a disadvantage because they are not able to match the level of funding offered by China.
Chinese influence in Central Asia is typified by the fact that the Republic controls over a quarter of oil production in Kazakhstan and most of Central Asian’s natural gas is imported to China through the CA-China gas pipeline that was constructed with Chinese loans. Another example would be SREB funding for Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power plant, which is also receiving financial support from Russia. Perhaps a more worrying sign is that China appears to be moving from a ‘soft-power’ approach, through economic assistance, to ‘hard-power’ projects such as airports and military bases.
According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, China has invested almost $26 billion in the region since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Other estimates put the figure much higher, with a possible $60 billion in trade deals over the same period.
As the level of Central Asian debt has increased, with a corresponding amount of Chinese involvement in the five Central Asian countries, anti-Chinese protests are growing across the region. Apart from concern over the level of debt, people are calling for a reduction in Chinese work permits. A situation is emerging whereby the people of Central Asia could be open to alternative economic partners, particularly from the West.
From the outset, China had hoped that the positive image of the Belt and Road Initiative, together with generous loan packages, would divert attention away from the Republic’s poor reputation concerning the Muslim population of Xinjiang Province. While the plight of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang has received world-wide condemnation, it is of particular concern to fellow Muslims of Central Asia. Alongside the Xinjiang issue, the rights of the people of Hong Kong and deteriorating trade relations with the USA, China’s reputation world-wide has recently suffered a further blow due to the Coronavirus, with accusations that the Republic withheld vital information during the early stages of the outbreak in Wuhan Province.
China’s status in Central Asia is being closely watched by both Russia and the USA. The Russians are especially concerned over China’s subtle shift from a ‘soft power’ approach to ‘hard power’ projects, typified by China’s opening, in April 2020, of an airport in the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous District that is dangerously close to the borders with Afghanistan and Tajikistan. China claims that this is the first of many airports to be built in the region that are intended to promote tourism. Russia, on the other hand, sees this as an opportunity for China to access the people and resources of a much-contested region.
As China’s involvement in Central Asia has become more aggressive, Russia’s response has been to reassess her relationship with her erstwhile ally. Consequently, Moscow is making efforts to counter-balance Chinese activities. For example, in recent years, Russia has justified her military presence at the Kant Air Base, in Kyrgystan, as being necessary to combat Islamist terrorism. However, judging by the equipment at the Base, Russia’s presence appears to be more about territorial security backed by military might, than combatting terrorism.
Similar moves have taken place in Tajikistan. According to Paul Goble’s article ‘Russian Military Seeking to Counter Growing Chinese Role in Central Asia’ (June 18, 2020, Jamestown Foundation), Tajikistani security expert Muslim Buriyev, says that, “until recently, there existed a balance between Russia and China in the region. Moscow was “responsible” for security, while Beijing spearheaded regional investment. Now, however, the Chinese have shown that Central Asia has ceased to be only a zone of economic interests for them, and they are gradually building up their military cooperation there.”.
Until recently, America’s interest in Central Asia was generally seen through the prism of either Russia’s involvement in the region, or Afghanistan and the War on Terror. In 2011, for example, Hilary Clinton, then Secretary of State, proposed a New Silk Road initiative. Known as the Lapis Lazuli project, the aim was to create a sustainable Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of US troops, through regional trade, transit and infrastructure projects. Crucially, it would provide a trade and transport route from Afghanistan, via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to Turkey.
In recent years, as China continues to make inroads into the region, America has come to realise that the Central Asian states are geopolitically significant in their own right. Consequently, in February 2020, Washington released its own Central Asian strategy.
According to its Policy Objectives:
“the United States will work with Central Asian states to build their resilience to short and long-term threats to their stability; to strengthen their independence from malign actors; and to develop political, economic, and security partnerships with the United States. U.S. development efforts should foster regional independence and not create dependency.
Specific objectives include: joint military training to reduce terrorist threats; to support stability in Afghanistan and to promote United States investment in and development of Central Asia. In order to achieve these aims, over $34 million dollars was to be put aside for economic connectivity and the environment, as well as $90 million for border security. Since 1991, over 40,000 Central Asian students have received American funding and over a million Central Asians visit the United States each year, thereby indirectly strengthening American influence in the region.
American strategy, and that of Russia, is often couched in terms of countering terrorism. But Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is far less a threat than in other parts of the world. This is partly because Islam was suppressed during the Soviet period and is now non-sectarian. Furthermore, although some Central Asians were known to have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, their number amounted to no more than about 1,000. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, State, Religion and Radicalism in Central Asia, November 2014)
Putting aside the threat of terrorism, America’s Central Asian strategy appears to have two main aims. First, to counter-balance that of China in terms of trade and second, to secure a stable Afghanistan. Since Western forces have gradually been withdrawing from Afghanistan, America is now encouraging the five Central Asian States to work closely with the country. The fear is that a weak Afghanistan would be vulnerable to advances from Russia, China or perhaps even a rising nationalist India. Each of these countries, as well as Islamic terrorism, could be described as ‘malign actors’, as referred to in the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2015-2019 policy document.
Today, the countries of Central Asia are in a stronger position than in recent history. No longer are they simply gatekeepers of a trade route, whose loyalty and co-operation has been sought by more powerful neighbours. Today, Central Asia consists of independent nation-states that are rich in natural resources. Moreover, these resources are in great demand by the developed world. Consequently, the people of Central Asia are in a position to be able to choose their own trade and political partners.
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(the above forms the Epilogue to the publication 'A History of Central Asia)
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